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Abstract
Norms play an important role in establishing social order. The
current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact
of norms with regard to coordination and cooperation. However, the
issue of norm-related con
ict deserves more attention. We develop a
general theory of \normative con
ict" by dierentiating between two
dierent kinds of con
ict. The rst results from distinct expectations
of which means should be chosen to full the norm, the second from
distinct expectations of how strong the norm should restrain the self-
interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative con
ict
in an experiment that applies the \strategy method" to the ultima-
tum game. Our data reveal normative con
ict among dierent types
of actors, in particular among egoistic, equity, equality and \cherry
picker" types.
JEL-Classication: Z130, C91, D30
Keywords: Social norms, normative con
ict, cooperation, ultimatum game, strat-
egy method, equity
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of how we ought to behave. Often, we are not even aware of how societal rules
in
uence the way we speak, greet, dress, eat, or express gratitude or love. By sim-
plifying the complexity of social life, norms serve as a \lubricant" of social order
and facilitate social interaction. It is quite remarkable, moreover, that normative
restrictions and constraints can have the paradoxical eect of allowing more free-
dom of action. Social norms can enhance the welfare of a group by proscribing
the contribution to collective goods such as a clean environment, a safe neigh-
borhood, public infrastructure facilities, trust in business relationships, reciprocal
social relations or con
ict resolution in general.
The problem of norm emergence has garnered the lion's share of attention
(Ullmann-Margalit, 1977; Bicchieri, 1990; Coleman, 1990; Voss, 2001). The topical
argument explains the emergence of social norms by means of the \shadow of the
future". The expectation of future interactions can outweigh the temptation of
one-sided, singular exploitation (Taylor, 1987; Raub and Voss, 1986; Fudenberg
and Maskin, 1986; Ellickson, 1991). In addition, other mechanisms have been
proposed, such as reputation (Raub and Weesie, 1990), signaling (Spence, 1974;
Molm et al., 2000) and altruistic punishment (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gintis,
2007).
Our intention here is not to challenge the prominence of these contributions,
but rather enrich the literature by demonstrating that all these routes to coop-
eration require a necessary precondition: Actors have to share equivalent social
norms. The fullment of this requirement is not trivial, since there are numer-
ous possible normative alternatives, which solve the same cooperation problem
in dierent ways. Members of the same group can hold quite distinct behavioral
expectations of how cooperation should be achieved. This phenomenon, referred
to as \normative con
ict", does not generate cooperation, but con
ict. If actors
have internalized a dierent norm than their interaction partners, they can have
the best intentions and do their best, but nevertheless, their behavior would be
perceived as improper. They fall apart in con
ict, despite both sides are convinced
of having behaved in an adequate way.
In the following, we develop a classication of normative con
ict. This classi-
cation identies two sources of con
ict. On the one hand, actors may adhere to
mutually exclusive behavioral expectations of how one ought to behave. On the
other hand, they may have distinct expectations concerning how strong a given
norm should restrict the self-interest of the target actor. We call the rst source
of con
ict the \normative content" and the second one \normative commitment".
Subsequently, we outline our theory of normative con
ict and exemplify it for the
case of bargaining norms with an ultimatum game. Further, we report the results
from our experimental data and study the empirical magnitude and signicance
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icts in the light of our theory.
1 A perspective of normative con
ict
So far, we referred to social norms as a behavioral expectation regarding what
ought to be or ought not to be done. For the establishment of our theory of
normative con
ict, we have to be more precise. First, let us refer to norm-relevant
situations as situations in which social norms exist. In such situations, almost
every member of a population believes that almost every other member has a
certain behavioral expectation. These expectations are directed towards the so-
called target actors of a norm, or shorter, norm targets. Moreover, norms are to
the benet of a certain group of actors, called beneciaries of a norm.1 We dene
social norm as a commonly known behavioral expectation among beneciaries and
target actors regarding how the target actors ought to behave, which is enforced
by sanctions in case of violations.2 Note that a norm target and a beneciary can
be the same person, but they can also belong to a dierent group of people.
For the purpose of specifying the concept of normative con
ict, we can sub-
divide two elements that build the structure of social norms. These two elements
specify the factors that generate the behavioral expectation. We term the rst
element the normative content. The normative content may be dened as the kind
of behavior that is prescribed or proscribed in a norm-relevant situation. It can
be understood as the method that ought to be considered by the norm targets to
serve the beneciaries' interests. The second element of norms considers that social
norms imply obligations. The normative expectations commits the target actor to
restrict her self-interest in favor of the beneciaries' well-being. Consequently, we
may dene this level of normative commitment as the degree of how much the tar-
get actor ought to sacrice her own interests. The level of normative commitment
is, however, not xed. While some norms may require strong restrictions, others
are less demanding.
This distinction enables us to classify two dierent types of normative con
ict,
which we illustrate in the following with the social norm to signal trustworthi-
ness. Often there exist group norms that prescribe their members to signal their
trustworthiness (cf. Raub, 2004). These signaling devices should be costly so that
untrustworthy actors, who seek only short-term benets, can be sorted out. It
1Note that the terms \target actor" and \beneciary" stem from Coleman (1990, 247).
2For a discussion of dierent denitions of social norms see Opp (2001) and Elster
(1989), for a current review on social norms see Rauhut and Krumpal (2008), for literature
on the punishment aspect see Yamagishi (1986); Heckathorn (1989), and for a microscopic
foundation of coordination norms see Helbing (1992) and also Young (1993).
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dierent group members. One social group, for example, might demand the wear-
ing of expensive suits from a certain brand, another group signifying piercings,
and another tatoos. Thus, norms with dierent normative contents have the equal
potential to achieve trust and cooperation; however, dierent actors may expect
adherence to a dierent content, giving rise to normative con
ict.
The second source for normative con
ict can spark o if actors regard a dif-
ferent normative commitment as appropriate. Regarding the example to signal
trustworthiness, the group members might be subject to severe restrictions, such
as to place the tatoo on the face or the piercing in the lips. In contrast, the so-
cial norm could require less normative commitment, such as to mark the body at
less visible and painful spots like the upper arm or the bum. Although an actor
invested in a costly signal, it may be regarded as insucient by others due to too
little commitment. For example, group members who similarly chose the tatoo as
the normative content to signal trustworthiness may nevertheless be in con
ict as
to whether it should mark restrictive places such as the face or less restrictive ones
like the bum.
As revealed by the examples, actors can adhere to social norms, remain under
the belief of behaving correctly and still have con
icts with each other. Conse-
quently, we dene normative con
ict as the situation, in which the norm targets
and the beneciaries hold dierent behavioral expectations of how the targets
ought to behave in a given norm-relevant situation. We can see from the examples
above how normative con
ict emerges due to the actors' adherence to dierent
normative contents or levels of normative commitment.
We distinguish our theory of normative con
ict from a theory of conventions
(Lewis, 1969). While conventions are self-enforcing coordination rules, for example
driving on the right side of the street, we regard social norms as the prescription
to behave cooperatively in social dilemmas (cf. Voss, 2001). With respect to sig-
naling trustworthiness, tatoos or wearing tailor-made suits require constant costs
and eorts with the temptation to undercut the expected behavior. Further, our
approach concentrates on informal social norms rather than legal norms.
2 Bargaining norms as an exemplication of
normative con
ict
Bargaining norms can serve as an illustration of both kinds of normative con
icts,
the one resulting from adherence to dierent normative contents and the other one
from dierent commitments. The distribution of work in the household (Lundberg
and Pollak, 1996), relative wage dierences (Fehr and G achter, 2000), or the cri-
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are embedded in norm-relevant situations and thus prone to con
ict. Con
ict can
arise, when a good is scarce and demand exceeds supply. In these situations, social
norms shape the expectations of the distribution of these goods.
We focus on norms of distributional justice which are based on the principle
of allocating resources according to the criteria of eort or equality.3 These norms
can be distinguished with respect to the content of the norm: Equity norms assert
that the individual input is the only criterion which determines the output to a
certain extent. Those who invest more eort shall be compensated more generously
(Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964; Adams, 1965; Cook and Emerson, 1978). With eort,
we understand individual contributions in terms of time, endeavor, energy or other
costly individual resources to achieve a goal. Adams' (1965) classical denition of
equity refers to the equivalence of the quotient of outcome and eort (Oi=Ei =
Oj=Ej) for all involved actors i;j. As Harris (1976) points out, this formulation
of equity is rather simple, but it captures the relevant point.
In contrast, equality norms do not rely on individual eort as an element of
the normative content. For equality norms, the material equality of outcomes is
the only criterion that ought to be satised. Thus, we can write the share that an
equality norm prescribes to oer to the beneciary as 1=n, with n denoting the
number of group members among the good is shared.
The second part of the norm is determined by the level of normative commit-
ment, stating how much the individual input should be weighted with respect to
the individual self-interest. We can speak of a pure equity norm, if there is full
normative commitment, so that selshness does not justify any deviance from the
principle of eort. If the equality norm prescribes full normative commitment,
it does not allow deviation from the equal split. Figure 1 gives an exemplary
illustration of both norms with respect to the relative eort of two actors.
3 Previous empirical results
The empirical literature on bargaining norms supports that social groups are het-
erogenous in their adherence to either equity or equality norms (Lissowski et al.,
1991; Jasso and Wegener, 1999; Liebig and Verwiebe, 2000). Equality norms are
frequently observed in bargaining experiments if players are homogenous. For in-
stance the equal split is usually the modal outcome in the ultimatum game (Roth,
1995), and is also commonly observed in real world settings, such as among family
3There is a variety of other norms of distributive justice, considering for example other
criteria such as need or status; for reviews see Cook and Hegtvedt (1983) or Deutsch
(2000).
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(a) (b) (c) shared content: equality shared content: equity shared commitment
Figure 1. Illustration of normative conﬂict resulting from (a) adherence to different
normative contents or (b and c) different normative commitments. In (a), the nor-
mative conﬂict between a holder of an equity norm and a holder of an equality norm
is increasingly prevalent for actors who show increasingly different effort levels. In
(b), actors adhere to the same normative content of an equality norm; however,
increasingly different commitments trigger stronger conﬂict. In (c), actors adhere to
the same normative content of an equity norm, but are prone to conﬂict for different
levels of normative commitment.
6
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 087members or friends (Morgan and Sawyer, 1967).
Equity norms are often found in survey and vignette studies in which the out-
come of heterogenous work eort had to be evaluated (Konow, 1996). According to
these studies, about two thirds of the respondents regarded it as fair if income was
allocated according to the working time. This was conrmed with experimental
studies, in which \earned" property rights, for instance buying in an auction the
right to be the proposer in an ultimatum game (G uth and Tietz, 1986) or winning
it in a quiz (Homan et al., 1994), dramatically increased the proportion of oers
which took the eort into account.
Moreover, the plurality of norms was conrmed with a variation of eort in
experiments. In early reward allocation experiments, the participants were of-
ten payed for commonly solving an experimental task. Afterwards, the common
money could be divided by one of the players. Mikula (1972) and Mikula and
Uray (1973) report two-person games, where the over-achieving player applied the
equality norm to compensate the under-performing partner. However, the under-
performing player usually honored the ecient player's merits and allocated ac-
cording to equity norms.4 Thus, two norms were applied in the same situation;
however, the experimental design was not suited to analyze normative con
ict.
Charness and Grosskopf (2001) experimentally tested the preferences of players
regarding eciency and equality. In their dictator-like experiment, norms of e-
ciency were often preferred to norms of equality. Their design let one person choose
between two allocations, one dividing equally, the other dividing a larger amount of
money unequally (usually in favor of the other person). Between 66 and 88 percent
of dictators (N=61) chose the unequal allocation, sometimes even if they would
have been better o with the equal but less ecient allocation. Finally, Gantner
et al. (2001) experimentally identied dierent patterns of allocation norms, e.g.
equality, equity and eciency, but, as the previous studies, they did not explicitly





We conducted a variation of the ultimatum game experiment (G uth et al., 1982).
In this game, one proposer and one responder bargain over a given amount of
4The results might have been in
uenced by a \generosity bias" due to deception of the
participants and due to the experimental design. See Konow (2003) for a discussion of
this argument.
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responder accepts the oer, she receives the share and the proposer can keep the
rest of the cake. If the responder rejects the oer, the cake is lost and nobody gets
anything. This experiment is one of the most parsimonious methods for measuring
normative behavior. A high oer may be regarded as adherence to a fairness norm
and the rejection as a punishment for violating the norm.
Our rst variation introduced a real eort task in the ultimatum game. Our
eort task let the subjects invest their own time prior to the experiment. Thus,
every subject could decide on her own as to invest spare time in order to earn
more money later on. Five days before the experiment, the subjects received a
seven page long text of a Wikipedia entry on the Westminster Palace via email.5
An accompanying letter informed the subjects that their preparation of the text
will in
uence their possible earnings in the experiment. We chose a rather specic
topic to ensure that everybody actually had to learn the text and nobody could
benet from her respective eld of studies (such as mathematics or paleontology).
At the beginning of the laboratory experiment, the subjects had to answer twenty
questions about Westminster Palace. There were ve answer categories, one of
which was correct. For each correct answer, subjects earned 1 Euro. Thus, the
maximum earning was 20 Euro and purely random answers had an expectation
value of 4 Euro. In the ultimatum bargaining part, the joint earnings of two ran-
domly drawn players were pooled to form the cake. This procedure was designed
to induce a feeling of personal eort and inherent monetary earnings. In particu-
lar, the eort was real in the sense that subjects could spend their own spare time.
In contrast, previous experiments measured eort with the subjects' performance
during a xed time in the lab, which all subjects anyway decided to spend by
accepting their participation in the experiment.6
Our second variation of the ultimatum game introduced an enhanced method
for measuring normative behavior on the individual level, called the strategy vector
method (Selten, 1967; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Falk and Fischbacher, 2002). A
\simple" ultimatum game with eorts would ask a proposer to oer her responder
a certain amount of money. The responder could accept or reject this particular
oer, while both players knew both particular eort levels. This method would
only allow to test oers and their acceptance for two particular eort levels. In
contrast, our implementation of the strategy vector method allows for measuring
the oer and the acceptance for every possible combination of eort levels. For
5Wikipedia contributors, "Westminster Palace," Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia,
http : ==de:wikipedia:org=wiki=PalaceofWestminster (accessed May 04,2008 14:40)
6For instance, G achter and Riedl (2005) and Rauhut and Junker (2009) implemented a
general knowledge quiz without the opportunity to prepare for it beforehand and Frohlich
et al. (2004) let subjects proofread a text to correct spelling errors.
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subjects i and j were matched by the computer.7 Player i was informed that she
earned 10 Euro in the quiz but was not yet informed about player j's eort level
and her actual role. Instead, we asked her about all decisions for every possible
eort level in both roles: In the rst step, she was asked in the role of the proposer
of how much she oers if her responder j contributed 0 Euro, 1 Euro, 2 Euro,
:::, 19 Euro, 20 Euro. In a second step, the roles switched and player i was
asked for the minimal oer she is willing to accept if her proposer j contributed 0
Euro, 1 Euro, 2 Euro, :::, 19 Euro, 20 Euro, which we refer to as the \acceptance
threshold". Player i and player j similarly entered 21 decisions as a proposer
and 21 decisions as a responder. As a next step, the computer calculated the
joint cake size of player i and j. Suppose that player i contributed 10 and j 15
Euro to the cake. Then, the computer compared whether the proposer's oer for
the responder's eort of 15 was at least as high as the responder's acceptance
threshold for a proposer's eort of 10. The money was paid, if the oer was as
high or higher than the responder's acceptance threshold, otherwise the money
was lost. Summing up, the strategy vector method has the advantage to return 21
decisions as a proposer and 21 decisions as a responder for each subject (compared
to 1 decision in the \simple" ultimatum game).
4.2 Procedure and participants
The experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher
(2007). At the beginning of each session, the subjects were randomly assigned to
one of the computer terminals. Some general instructions regarding the procedure
were given on paper. The subjects were informed about the knowledge quiz and
it was once again pointed out that their preparation of the text has a strong
in
uence on their performance in this quiz and respective monetary earnings. After
completing the quiz, the subjects received the instructions for the ultimatum game
experiment. Next, they had to respond to test questions regarding the rules of the
game up to three times, allowing us to verify that the participants understood
the rules. The experiment started when there were no further questions to the
experimenter. Communication was prohibited from that point onwards. After
completing the ultimatum game experiment, subjects were individually paid at
their seats at the end of the session.
The subjects were 92 undergraduate students of the University of Leipzig,
recruited from a wide range of academic disciplines. 47 subjects were male and 45
7We matched two players from two separate rooms according to their results in the quiz.
We implemented two mechanisms: The rule \best against best" enhances the variance in
the stake size and the rule \best against worst" the variance between subjects.
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The subjects were matched such that the proposers and responders were located in
separate rooms. Three of our experimental sessions consisted of twenty subjects,
one of eighteen and one of fourteen subjects.8
5 Hypotheses
In the following, we present six hypotheses on normative con
ict and explain their
theoretical derivation thereafter.
Hypothesis 1 The average oer and the average acceptance threshold is higher
than zero.
The measurement of normative con
ict requires that the participants have
to perceive the ultimatum game as a norm-relevant situation. Thus, almost ev-
erybody has to believe that almost every other participant has a \normative"
expectation and not a selsh one. A selsh expectation would correspond with
the game theoretical concept of subgame-perfect equilibria: The selsh responder
accepts every positive oer because a little amount is still better than facing the
consequences of rejection by receiving nothing at all. The proposer anticipates
the responders' choice, oers the smallest positive amount, which is accepted by
the responder. While the subgame-perfect equilibrium is rather straightforward,
players with \normative" expectations will behave dierently: Empirical results
demonstrate that oers below 20 % of the cake are frequently rejected. This pun-
ishment of selsh behavior can be regarded as a consequence of the violation of a
fairness norm. Proposers anticipate the potential punishment and may in addition
comply with the fairness norm themselves so that low oers are rare and close-to-
equal splits are the most frequent outcome (Roth, 1995; Cameron, 1999; Homan
et al., 1996; Oosterbeek et al., 2004; G uth et al., 2007).
Hypothesis 2 The higher the responder's eort, the higher the responder's ac-
ceptance threshold and the higher the proposer's oer.
The normative con
ict over contents requires two applicable norms. The norm
of equal splits is usually observed in ultimatum bargaining experiments, in which
endowments are supposed to compensate the eorts of the participants, i.e. the
time spent in the lab (for an overview see G uth, 1995). These eorts are usually
the same for all participants, so that the straightforward allocation norm is to
8In sessions 1 and 4, fewer subjects than expected showed up.
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endowment introduces eort as an additional normative criterion. This triggers
the behavioral expectation of an equity norm. Thus, as a precondition of normative
con
ict, eort should have at least for some subjects a signicant impact on the
fairness decisions in the ultimatum game.
Hypothesis 3 The population is heterogenous in either adhering to equity or
equality norms.
The normative con
ict over contents requires heterogeneity of the population in
their adherence to dierent normative contents. In our context, some subjects have
to adhere to the equity norm while others to the equality norm. This heterogeneity
can be measured if some subjects evaluate eort as important for their oer and
acceptance decisions (the \equity players"), while others do not consider it as
important (the \equality players").
Hypothesis 4 Both populations, the followers of equity and equality norms, are
heterogenous in their commitment to their respective norm.
The normative con
ict over commitments requires that some actors believe
that the norm ought strongly restrict the pursuit of the self-interest, while others
expect only mild restrictions. We suspect that dierent levels of normative com-
mitment occur in situations, in which norm targets and beneciaries have opposing
interests. Such asymmetric situations are given if a worse o beneciary claims
that she ought to be compensated by a better o target actor. The ultimatum
game is an ideal representation of such asymmetric situations.Equity players with
a low commitment do not fully compensate opponent's additional eort, nor do
equality players with a low commitment insist on as much as the equal split.
Hypothesis 5 The stronger the eect of eort, the lower the subjects' average
oer and acceptance threshold for responders with little eort.
Further evidence that the population is heterogenous in either adhering to
equity or equality norms can be obtained by the following implication: We expect a
negative correlation between the subject's adherence to equity rather than equality
norms and her oer and acceptance threshold for responders with little eort.
Hypothesis 6 The larger the dierences between the eorts of proposer and re-
sponder, the higher the probability of normative con
ict.
If a holder of an equity norm interacts with a holder of an equality norm, they
have similar normative expectations for the case of similar eort levels. There-
fore, the probability of normative con
ict over contents increases with increasingly
dierent levels of eort.
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6.1 Heterogeneous normative behavior on the macro
level
First, we test hypotheses 1-5 on a higher level of aggregation (sec. 6.1). We
continue our analysis with a more detailed investigation on the individual level
(sec. 6.2). Subsequently, we investigate hypothesis 6 and whether the ndings
conrm our perspective on normative con
ict (sec. 6.3).
Our statistical estimation results are based on multilevel models. These mod-
els quantify the impact of eort on the proposer's oer and on the responder's
acceptance threshold and, more importantly, the variance in the subjects' level of
normative commitment in their consideration of eort. The multilevel structure
takes the clustering of the 21 decisions per subject into account.9
Result 1 In average, proposers oer considerable amounts of money and low of-
fers are frequently rejected.
The participants do understand the game as a norm-relevant situation. There
is signicant evidence that most players are guided by social norms rather than
by playing the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of oering and accepting the
smallest possible amount: The intercept of the proposer shows that even for the
case that the responder contributed nothing, proposers oer 33 % of the cake on
average. Furthermore, the responders' positive intercept of 31 % in the xed-eects
part of the model reveals that the responders are punishing norm violations at own
costs, supporting that responders perceive the ultimatum game as norm-relevant.
Result 2 The higher the responders' eort the higher their least accepted oer
and the higher the proposers' oer.
Result 2 supports our claim that at least some subjects regard the criterion of
eort as norm relevant. In addition to the proposers' and responders' intercepts,
the relative contribution to the common pool signicantly aects both, the oer
and the acceptance threshold: If a responder contributed the full cake, she receives
a 29 % higher oer and has a 15 % higher acceptance threshold than if the proposer
contributed the full cake. The empirical relevance of eort, therefore, provides the
precondition for heterogeneity of normative expectations.
The random eects suggest that our subjects are heterogenous in their level
of normative commitments and contents. This argument is supported by three
results.
9For multilevel analysis see Snijders and Bosker (1999) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal
(2005).
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the proposer’s relative offers and on the responder’s relative acceptance thresholds.
Proposer's Responder's









Standard deviation intercept 0.20 0.24
(0.015) (0.018)
Standard deviation responder's eort 0.39 0.35
(0.030) (0.027)




Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Note: Effort, offers and acceptance thresholds are normalized. This normalization ex-
presses the efforts of the responders relative to the efforts of the proposers (scaling from
0-1). Further, the offers and acceptance thresholds are expressed in relation to the cake
sizes (scaling from 0-1).
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ects of eort on oers
and acceptance thresholds.
Result 3 is supported by the large and signicant standard deviation of the
responder's eort in the random eects part of table 1.
Result 4 The population is heterogenous in the subjects' average oers and ac-
ceptance thresholds.
Result 4 is supported by the large and signicant standard deviation of the
intercept in the random eects part of table 1.
Result 5 There is a signicantly negative correlation between the subjects' eects
of eort and their average oers and acceptance thresholds.
Result 5 is supported by the large and signicant negative correlation between
random slopes and intercepts in the random eects part of table 1.
Based on results 3 to 5, we conclude to the existence of three distinct types
of normative behavior in our population: Equality players with high intercepts
and low slopes, equity players with the inversed pattern of low intercepts and
high slopes and egoistic players with low intercepts and low slopes. Moreover, the
strong negative correlations between intercepts and slopes suggest that equality
and equity players are more common than egoistic players.
In the following, we investigate the distinct types of normative behavior in more
detail by exploring graphically all data points for the bivariate relation between
eort and oer, and between eort and acceptance threshold. Figure 2 illustrates
the proposers' oers (top) and responders' acceptance thresholds (bottom) for
given responders' eort. In the top gure, it can be seen that most oers cluster
around the two lines of equity norm and equality norm. We can regard the pure
equity and equality norm as attractors or \focal points" in Schelling's sense. But
not all proposers adhere to pure equity or equality norms. There are also a few
\hyper-fair" oers (in the upper left corner). A large fraction of oers is located
between the equity line and the equality line (lower left and upper right corner),
or even below both lines (lower right corner). Thus, some proposers are biased by
self-interest. Although some proposers enlarge their prospective share by giving
moderately low oers, only a few play the subgame-perfect equilibrium solution
and oer the minimal amount.
Among the responders, there are surprisingly many players who adhere to the
equality norm and are willing to punish oers below 50 % with rejection. This
is an unusual nding, as many previous studies report that oers of 40 % and
above are almost always accepted. In contrast to the results for the proposers,
14
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Figure 2. Proposer’s relative offers as a function of the responder’s relative effort
(top) and responder’s relative acceptance thresholds as a function of the respon-
der’s relative effort (bottom). The histograms on the left show the distribution of the
relative height of offers and acceptance thresholds. The axis labels depict percent-
ages. The distinct normative types are illustrated by additional lines for equality and
equity norms. Most offers cluster around these lines, while there is considerable
noise, too. Responders cluster less around the equity and equality lines. Respon-
ders show more risk-averse behavior than proposers, indicated by a third cluster of
considerably low acceptance thresholds. 15
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 087the "attraction" to the pure equity and equality norm is not as strong for the
responders. As a result, the variance in the responders' decisions is much higher.
Further, the histogram on the left shows that 20 % of the acceptance thresholds
are below 20 %. The respective players are willing to accept very low oers,
sometimes even if they contributed much more than their proposer. We also nd
these patterns in the responders' scatter plot of gure 2, revealing a third cluster
on the very bottom.
6.2 Distinct normative types on the micro-level
How can we understand the structures on the macro-level by micro-level behavior?
We continue our evaluation of the necessary conditions of normative con
ict by
examining the individual decisions and nd surprisingly clear patterns. Figure 3
depicts four characteristic proposer proles and gure 4 four characteristic respon-
der proles. Player 2 (upper left) represents a pure equality player: In the role of
the proposer (gure 3) and in the role of the responder (gure 4), player 2 oers
and claims always 50 % of the pool, regardless of the dierences in eort between
proposer and responder. In the upper right part of gure 3 and 4, player 3 shows
pure equity behavior. Player 3 oers always exactly as much as the responder's
eort and always demands at least her eort as a responder. As a third type, we
nd players who play the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Player 13 (lower left)
constantly oers and accepts the smallest possible positive unit of 0.50 Euro. Con-
sequently, we call this player type the egoist. We found even another type, showing
an interesting hybrid behavior between self-interest and norm-compliance. This
fourth type plays according to the equity norm as long as she is a relatively high
achiever, and switches to the equality norm if she is a relatively low achiever. See
player 20 as a proposer and player 36 as a responder of this type on the lower right
of gure 3 and 4. We call this players cherry pickers, as they seem to adhere to
norms, but \pick" the particular norm, which serves their self-interest best.
Most of the players in our experiment followed consistently the pure character-
istics of equity, equality, egoist or cherry picker, illustrated by the individual cases
in gure 3 and 4. The player types have been categorized as follows. The oer
function of an equality player is characterized by a slope between eort and oer
of zero and intercepts the Y-axis at 50 %, the oer function of an equity player
has a slope around 1 and intercepts the Y-axis at about 0 %. Egoists could be
characterized by a slope as well as an intercept around zero, while cherry pickers
have a low intercept and an intermediate slope, however the function is concave.
In order to assign all subjects to the previously dened types, we developed a sort-
ing algorithm based on OLS regressions. This approach classies the individual
strategies according to the respective intercept and slope. We categorized players
16












































































Figure 3. Offers of selected players. The larger ﬁgures depict individually observed
strategies. We ﬁnd 54% (n=50) equality proposers (upper left), 39% (n=36) eq-
uity proposers (upper right), 3% (n=3) egoistic proposers (lower left) and 3% (n=3)
cherry picker proposers (lower right). The insets depict the superposition of all in-
dividual decisions in the population classiﬁed as belonging to the corresponding
type.
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Figure 4. Acceptance thresholds of selected players. We ﬁnd 52 % (n=48) equal-
ity responder (upper left), 25% (n=23) equity responder (upper right), 20% (n=18)
egoistic responder (lower left) and 3% (n=3) cherry picker (lower right). The insets
depict the superposition of all individual decisions in the population classiﬁed as
belonging to the corresponding type.
with a low slope and a high intercept as equality (see gure ?? in the appendix),
with a low slope and a low intercept as egoist, with a high slope as equity and
with a quadratic slope as cherry picker. We refer to the appendix for an extensive
discussion of our sorting algorithm.
The insets in the gures 3 and 4 describe the resulting distribution of dierent
proposer and responder types. More than half of the proposers adhere to equality
norms and about 40 % to equity norms, while cherry pickers and egoistic proposers
are the exception (3% each). Participants are more risk-averse if they are in the
role of the responder: While 48 % adhere to the equality norm, the fraction of
equity players is only 25 % and the fraction of egoistic responders reaches 20 %.
The proportion of cherry pickers is again small (3 %) as a result of the strict
denition.
18
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icts
We will continue our analysis by illustrating how the previously shown heterogene-
ity on the micro-level fosters the emergence of normative con
ict on the macro-
level. Therefore, we will illustrate how normative con
ict among players of dierent
normative types is caused. The upper left and upper right panels of gure 5 reveal
the existence of con
ict over contents. The upper left panel pictures an equity pro-
poser's oer and an equality responder's acceptance threshold. Con
ict emerges
because the proposer's adherence to the equity norm results in a lower oer than
the equality responder is willing to accept. The same kind of con
ict, though
with reversed roles, is depicted in the upper right panel. Our second classication
of normative con
icts results from dierent expectations regarding how strongly
one ought to commit oneself to a norm, depicted in the lower panels of gure 5.
The lower right panel describes the case of a proposer who commits herself only
moderately to an equity norm, while her responder shows a strong commitment.
The interaction results in con
ict because the proposer's oer does not fulll the
responder's expectations. But already fairly small deviations from the norm can
cause con
icts: In the lower right panel, two equality players interact. The con
ict
emerges because the proposer's oer is only slightly lower than one half, which was
demanded by the responder.
In the following, we apply our terminology of normative con
ict to the empirical
analysis of con
ict between the dierent strategy types. From now on, we focus
only on equity and equality types because these types are the most prevalent cases
in our data.10 In the following statistical analysis, we take all possible interactions
into account and not only those pairs, which have actually been matched in the
experiment. Note that this procedure does not bias our results because every
subject had to respond as a proposer and as a responder before they were actually
assigned to a role and matched with their opponent, i.e. no learning eects could
occur.11 Thus, we can base our estimation on 8190 interactions because each of the
n = 91 subjects can be matched as a proposer with each of the other subjects as a
responder, resulting in
n(n 1)
2 = 4095 interactions. Vice versa, each subject can be
matched as a responder with each of the other subjects as a proposer, resulting in
additional
n(n 1)
2 = 4095 interactions. As this procedure implies that each subject
met several decisions that are not independent, we correct for in
ated standard
10The other types are too rare for the analysis of con
ict: We identify 3 proposers and
3 responders as cherry-picker types and 3 proposers and 18 responders as egoistic types.
11We exclude one subject as an in
uential outlier, because this subject contributed zero
to the pool and showed very extreme behavior with oering everything as a proposer and
demanding everything as a responder. The previously reported results yield no dierences
for exclusion of this case.
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Figure 5. Representative empirical cases of normative conﬂict. The upper two ﬁg-
ures illustrate typical cases of conﬂict due to different normative contents, where an
equity proposer plays against an equality responder (upper left) or vice versa (upper
right). The actual match (i.e. the “conﬂict point” determined by their relative efforts)
is represented by the gray ﬁlling. The lower left ﬁgure illustrates the case of conﬂict
due to different commitments between an equity proposer and an equity responder,
the lower right ﬁgure between an equality proposer and an equality responder.
20
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z statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05
Clustering for decisions in subjects were
taken into account with robust standard errors
Table 3. Logistic regression with robust standard errors. The larger the differences
in contributions to the public good, the higher the likelihood of conﬂict, i.e. rejection
of offers.
theoretical perspective. As it is the diﬀerences in contributions that bring the
intra-norm conﬂict to light, we explore whether the diﬀerences in eﬀort be-
tween proposer and responder aﬀect the likelihood of conﬂict, i.e. that oﬀers
are rejected. Table 3 reports the results. The estimates reveal that the more
unequal the contributions to the common pool, the higher the probability of
conﬂict.
5 Discussion
This paper outlines a new theoretical perspective and provides empirical ev-
idence that social norms can generate conﬂict. We develop the distinction
between intra-norm and inter-norm conﬂict. The ﬁrst occurs due to a con-
ﬂict of interests between the beneﬁciaries and the targets of a norm, the
second due to the adherence to dissimilar social norms. We demonstrate
with a strategy ultimatum game experiment the empirical relevance of both
phenomena.
Humans apply diﬀerent norms of distributional justice if they invest dis-
similar eﬀorts to generate a common pool. We show with game theoretic
models that subjects can either hold an equality norm, i.e. claim half of the
pool regardless of their eﬀort, or an equity norm, i.e. claim the respective
share that corresponds with their relative eﬀort. We show the empirical rel-































Figure 8. Logistic regression with robust standard errors. The larger the differences





diﬀerence in relative eﬀort .0262∗∗∗
(0.006)
interactions 8372
clusters within subjects 92
Log-Likelihood -4999.65
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered for subjects)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3. Logistic regression with robust standard errors. The larger the differences

































difference in relative effort (%)
Figure 8. Logistic regression. The larger the differences in relative effort for con-
tributing to the common pool, the higher the probability of conﬂict. The table on
the left reports logit estimates and standard errors, the ﬁgure on the right displays
the corresponding changes in the probability of conﬂict. The grey area represents
the 95 % conﬁdence bounds for the logit coefﬁcient “difference in relative effort”.
Relative effort is measured in percentages with the own contribution divided by
the total contribution of the respective interaction between proposer and responder.
The number of interactions is calculated by all possible interactions between each
subject in the role of the proposer and all other subjects in the role of the respon-





diﬀerence in relative eﬀort 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
interactions 8190
clusters within subjects 91
Log-Likelihood -4897.05
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered for subjects)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3. Logistic regression with robust standard errors. The larger the differences


































difference in relative effort (%)
Figure 6. Logistic regression quantifying the impact of differential effort on con-
ﬂict. The larger the differences in relative effort contributed to the common pool,
the higher the probability of conﬂict. The table on the left reports logit estimates
and standard errors, the ﬁgure on the right displays the corresponding changes in
the probability of conﬂict. The grey area represents the 95 % conﬁdence bounds
for the logit coefﬁcient “difference in relative effort”. Relative effort i is measured
in percentages with the own contribution divided by the total contribution of the re-
spective interaction between proposer i and responder j. We take absolute values
of the differences in effort, i.e. ji   jj, and therefore do not differentiate whether
the proposer or the responder contributed more. The number of interactions is cal-
culated by all possible interactions between each subject in the role of the proposer
and all other subjects in the role of the responder. Clustering of subjects in these
interactions is taken into account by calculating robust standard errors.
errors with clustering for subjects. A comparable regression model that takes only
actual matches into account yielded similar results, however, with larger standard
errors.
So far, our analysis demonstrated the existence of heterogeneity in the pop-
ulation with regard to dierent norms of distributive justice. Subsequently, we
identied distinct types of normative behavior on the micro-level and analyzed in
which cases these types are prone to con
ict. For identifying the probability of
normative con
ict among two players, we refer to hypothesis 6: As is illustrated
in gure 1, the dierences between the proposer's and responder's eort spark the
con
ict over the alternative norms. The normative con
ict among an equality and
an equity player increases with increasing dierences in their levels of eort.
Result 6 The larger the dierences between the proposer's and responder's eorts,
the higher the probability of normative con
ict, indicated by higher rejection rates.
Result 6 is supported by gure 6 and the corresponding logistic regression
21




































































equality simmilar equity responder: equality equity different
conflict due to commitment
conflict due to content
Figure 7. Frequency of conﬂict for the situation that the proposer and the respon-
der adhere to different normative contents or different normative commitments. N
denotes the absolute frequency of these respective situations. The y-axis denotes
the relative frequency of the occurrence of conﬂict, measured by the rejection of the
offer.
model. Note that the data refers to all potential interactions between all players
in each role. The regression calculates the probability of con
ict as a function of
the dierence in relative eort between proposer and responder.
Our ndings conrm that normative con
ict is signicantly more likely for
unequal eort levels. The probability plot on the left reveals that about 25 %
of the subjects end up in con
ict with similar eorts, while 55 % with dissimilar
eorts, i.e. in which only one party contributed almost everything and the other
almost nothing.
Result 7 The con
ict due to dierent normative contents is more prevalent than
the con
ict due to dierent normative commitments.
To support our result 7, we simulated the interactions of every proposer with
every responder, using our empirical data. Figure 7 describes the relative fre-
quencies of the dierent forms of normative con
ict. Note that our concept of
con
ict over contents is the more prevalent source of con
ict compared to the case
of con
ict due to dierent commitments. From 2212 interactions among holders
22
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ict
emerges in only 32 % (782 out of 2480) of the interactions among holders of dif-
ferent levels of normative commitment. The percentage of content-related con
ict
is even higher if only equality proposers are considered (46 % or 426 out of 936
interactions), while the relative frequency of this type of con
ict with an equality
responder does not dier (31 % or 526 out of 1852). The The picture is slightly
dierent for equity proposers. Con
ict arises in 217 out of 628 interactions (35 %)
when the responder shares the proposer's norm, while 431 out of 1276 (34 %) fail
if the responder adheres to a dierent normative content. Thus, the data supports
our claim that the con
ict due to dierent normative contents is quite an impor-




This paper outlines a new theoretical perspective on social norms, which considers
con
ict as an inherent element of norms. The heterogeneity of norms is a potential
source of con
ict, contrary to the largely discussed capability of norms to promote
cooperation. Our empirical results are based on a strategy ultimatum game, in
which actors apply dierent norms of distributional justice if they dier in their
investments to a common project. A substantial fraction of our participants holds
an equality norm and demands an equal share of the cake irrespective of their
investments. Another, slightly smaller fraction holds an equity norm and demands
the share that corresponds to their investment. We show the empirical relevance
of normative con
ict, when both players prefer to contribute to the common good
of a \fair" share, but hold dierent norms regarding what they consider as fair.
We explain this kind of disagreement by the the adherence to dierent normative
contents. Furthermore, our evidence demonstrates another source of normative
con
ict. Our empirical data reveal that the adherence to similar norms is by
no means sucient to achieve cooperation. In fact, people have to agree on the
extend to which social norms should restrain their self-interests, i.e. people have to
commit themselves towards a norm to a similar extend. Even though they might
agree that, in principle, one should follow a specic norm, \undercutting" might be
regarded as legitimate by some, while it displeases others. Thus, dierent degrees
of normative commitment forms a second important source of normative con
ict.
Our experimental results show that the con
ict due to dierent normative contents
is more prevalent than con
ict stemming from dierent normative commitments.
The \cultural diversity" of social norms is therefore remarkably ambivalent.
On the one hand, the plurality of social norms can be enriching, refreshing and
23
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recognition of alternatives to our habits and behavioral standards that are taken
for granted opens our eyes for the arbitrariness of certain norms and for our often
nonre
ective tendency to follow traditional rules. This heterogeneity of normative
behavior can stimulate creativity and innovation in society, triggering the increase
of individual and public welfare. On the other hand, it is not sucient for the
accomplishment of cooperation, prosperity and social order that all members of
society adhere to normative expectations. The coexistence of distinct norms can
generate con
ict despite cooperative intentions. Besides, power plays a crucial role
in the determination of which behavioral expectations will last and prevail. There
is a constant struggle in society to obtain the power to dene those norms as valid
that are most favorable for the own interests. This struggle is often accompanied
with hypocritical rethorics to convince the disadvantaged to adhere to norms that
promote seemingly great benets. Due to the complexity of these social con
icts
and cleavages, future research will have to address the relations between power, the
internalization of norms and selsh behavior. Do, for instance, actors with higher
incomes tend to pursue equity norms and actors with more power norms, holding
exclusively for those with less power to benet those with more? We need both,
laboratory studies to test the theoretical relations on the micro-level, and surveys
to evaluate the social structure of normative con
ict. In conclusion, we believe
that our new focus on normative con
ict is fruitful in uncovering the double-edge
of social norms in promoting cooperation on one side, but con
ict on the other.
Appendix
We have developed a sorting algorithm to assign each subject to a distinct strat-
egy type of equity, equality, egoist or cherry picker. At rst, we estimated two
ordinary OLS regressions for each subject separately. The rst univariate regres-
sion estimated the eect of each additional unit of relative eort on the proposer's
oer (slope). Naturally, this regression as well returned a value for the inter-
cept with the interpretation of the proposer's oer for the case that the responder
contributed nothing (intercept). A second bivariate regression estimated the
quadratic slope between eort and oer, adding the responders squared eort as
an independent variable (effort2) A negative slope for effort2 indicates cherry
picker proposers, a positive slope of effort2 cherry picker responders. Thus, all
players can be categorized by the values of their slope, intercept and effort2.
In the next step, we dene critical values to assign the subjects to distinct
types. We estimated Epanechnikov kernel densities for the distribution of slope,
intercept and effort2 among all subjects. As can be seen in gure 8, the dis-
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Figure 8. Kernel density estimations and histograms of the distribution of the indi-
vidual regression parameters deﬁning the critical values. The variables “slope” and
“intercept” are determined using OLS regressions on the individual level (the player)
with offer or acceptance threshold as dependent variable and responders relative
effort as independent variable. The variable effort2 is determined using the same
OLS regression and adding the squared effort as independent variable. The critical
values are at the minimum density between the maxima of the bimodal distribution
of “slope” and “intercept” and +1/-1 standard deviation for responder/proposer for
effort2. The vertical lines describe the respective critical values.
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dene the critical values as the minimum between the two local maxima. The crit-
ical values for the proposers are slope = 0.29 and intercept = 0.21. The critical
values for the responders are slope = 0.26 and intercept = 0.26. For most of
the subjects, the additional quadratic term does not contribute explanatory power.
This means that most subjects do not abandon their normative expectations, if
stakes are raised. A straightforward method to choose the relevant critical value is
to separate at one standard deviation above zero effort2 = (0.77) for the respon-
der and one standard deviation below zero effort2 = (-0.65) for the proposer. By
this, we assign only those subjects to the cherry picker type, who obviously play
this strategy.
Consequently, subjects with the slope below the critical value and the intercept
above the critical value will be called equality player. Those with the slope and
the intercept below the critical value are egoistic types. If a proposer has a
slope above the critical value and the player's effort2 is above the critical value,
the player is referred to as equity type. We call proposers who do not react on
a squared eort (low slope of effort2) but show a strong reaction on additional
eort of the responder (high slope)"cherry pickers". The denitions are the same
for responders, but with two obvious minor adjustments: We call those players
equity, who are below the effort2 critical value, while players above this critical
value are called "cherry pickers".
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